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The dream is always the same. Congress should enact sweeping laws that turn every-thing over to technocratic regulators, giving them carte blanche to do whatever serves the public interest. These disinterested experts will apply the delegated authority wisely and effectively, delivering truth, jus-
tice, and prosperity—and will do so without the rent-seeking, 
log-rolling, and earmarks that are associated with the political 
branches (i.e., Congress and the president).
Of course, that’s often not the way things turn out. Market 
failure is real, but so is government failure. Regulators are not 
always neutral, and many of them are not actually technocratic 
experts. Stated differently, expertise informs their judgments, 
but so does politics (both in the sense of partisanship and of 
organizational machinations). They can pick sides and use their 
sweeping regulatory authority to make life miserable for those 
who are on the other side. 
Regulators can also screw up. Sometimes they don’t have the 
requisite information to understand (let alone fix) the problem. 
Sometimes their tools are the wrong ones for the job (i.e., “if the 
only tool you have is a hammer…”). Regulators can also be too 
risk-averse, or not risk-averse enough. They can have tunnel vision, 
or they can seek to use their power to leverage outcomes that lie 
far outside the scope of their properly delegated authority. They 
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can be too cozy with the industries they regulate, or not cozy 
enough. And so on. 
To be sure, some agencies are less prone to this laundry list 
of problems than others. Consider the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration. To its credit, the FDA has done a fairly good job 
of avoiding problems, but it is not perfect. 
The FDA’s biggest challenge is that it is in the business of 
making tradeoffs between innovation and safety. Advocates for 
each of these (laudable) goals are quick to condemn decisions that 
seem to favor the other goal. In the words of recently departed 
FDA commissioner Margaret Hamburg:
The balancing of risks and benefits is fundamental to FDA’s 
regulatory role. And it is always a challenge. We joke that FDA is 
viewed as having only two approval speeds: too fast and too slow. 
We are perceived as too quick to approve a drug or device when 
a significant safety issue is identified in the post-market context 
once the product is in widespread use. On the other hand, we 
were too slow in approving when a drug that has undergone a 
lengthy development and review is finally approved and provides 
a real therapeutic benefit to patients. The task for FDA’s scientist 
is to strike the right regulatory balance.
More concretely, those who prioritize innovation criticize the 
FDA for being too risk-averse in approving drugs because the 
agency (rightly) anticipates being pilloried for “false positives” 
(i.e., approving drugs it should not), but knows it will receive 
much less criticism for false negatives (i.e., delaying or denying 
approval of drugs that it should have). These critics, who tend 
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to come from the right side of the political spectrum, believe the 
result of this risk aversion is delayed and/or denied approvals, 
resulting in tens of thousands of invisible (but no less real) deaths. 
Conversely, those who prioritize safety believe that the FDA has 
been too willing to approve ineffective and risky drugs, in part 
because of congressional pressure to lower the standards for 
drug approval, compounded by the corrupting influence of user 
fees. (See “How Have User Fees Affected the FDA?” Spring 2002.) 
These critics, who tend to come from the left side of the political 
spectrum, believe the result is tens of thousands of visible deaths 
and considerable disability. Both sides point to specific examples 
supporting their respective positions and are quick to discount 
the concerns raised by the opposing side. 
These battles have been going on for decades, with both sides 
arguing about where, at any given point in time, the FDA falls 
on the drug approval “Goldilocks” spectrum (i.e., is the agency 
acting too fast, too slow, or just right?). These issues seem likely 
to remain policy perennials, if the recent debates over the 21st 
Century Cures Act and “Right to Try” laws are any indication. (See 
“Is State ‘Right to Try’ Legislation Misguided Policy?” Fall 2014.)
Notwithstanding these disputes, if you asked a random mem-
ber of the general public or of Congress to identify the single most 
important issue in the drug policy space, our bet is that “cost” 
would be by far the most popular response. There is no shortage 
of examples that help explain that response, whether it is Martin 
Shkreli (Daraprim), Mylan (the Epi-pen), or the spiral of increases 
in the sticker price for a wide array of brand-name drugs. (See 
“Legislating Drug Price Transparency,” Summer 2017.)
So where is the FDA when it comes to drug costs? When asked, 
FDA personnel are quick to explain that drug pricing is not their 
responsibility. As Zachary Brennan of the health care industry 
group Regulatory Affairs Professionals Society wrote in a Novem-
ber 2015 essay, “FDA doesn’t dip its toe into the pricing bog while 
deciding whether to approve or reject a new drug, and it also doesn’t 
negotiate with pharmaceutical companies over how to price drugs.” 
This response captures the agency’s longstanding position. Its 
organization, culture, and behavior reflect its self-understanding 
that it is the safety and efficacy czar. No drug gets onto the market 
without FDA permission, but once the drug is approved, the agency 
Martin Shkreli, former CEO of Turing Pharmaceuticals, confers with 
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has no interest in the price point at which it changes hands. Periodic 
attempts to get the agency to respond to drug pricing “problems” 
have been deflected, deflated, or simply ignored. 
As we detail below, the FDA’s decades-long honeymoon on this 
issue is almost certainly over. We anticipate the agency will come 
under increasing pressure to address drug pricing. When that 
happens, the question will no longer be whether it should pay 
attention to drug prices, but how and when the FDA should do so.
WHY THE FDA SHOULD PAY ATTENTION  
TO DRUG PRICES
Prices communicate information. Why wouldn’t an agency 
charged with regulating a market pay attention to pricing infor-
mation about the goods being sold in that market—particularly 
when the agency controls access to the market? Of course, the 
FDA does not regulate prices directly, but that does not mean 
the agency should simply ignore prices, even if it would prefer to 
focus on the technocratic “thumbs up” or 
“thumbs down” drug approval decision. 
Knowledgeable observers know that the 
agency’s statutory mandate focuses on safety 
and efficacy, not prices. But there are two 
distinct reasons why the FDA should pay at 
least some attention to drug prices. First, at 
least for generics, drug pricing can commu-
nicate information about the FDA’s perfor-
mance. Generic drug entry is an immensely 
powerful tool with which to lower drug 
prices. But if generics are not being approved 
in a timely fashion, drug prices may remain at elevated levels, even 
though the underlying drug is long since off-patent. 
Bureaucracies can easily become complacent about backlogs 
because they experience them only as an ever-growing pile of 
paperwork accumulating in the agency’s inbox. After all, it’s 
only paperwork. The pile was there yesterday and will be there 
tomorrow. Maybe drug companies have to wait longer for their 
drug approvals than they would like, but there are n + 1 holes in 
the dike that the FDA is guarding, and only n plugs with which 
to fill them. As long as every drug company is treated the same, 
no company has a valid complaint. 
But if the FDA starts paying attention to drug pricing, the 
human cost of the agency’s approval backlog suddenly becomes 
immediate and concrete. Agency leaders are forced to recognize the 
significant harms that result when the FDA has a backlog of generic 
drug approval requests. Indeed, drug prices provide an immediate 
feedback loop on the real-world consequences of the agency fail-
ing to clear its backlog. The FDA can also use pricing information 
to identify and prioritize applications that should get bumped to 
the front of the queue for processing. And it can use the pricing 
information to lobby Congress for more personnel: “We need more 
money to process generic drug applications. The level and trends 
in drug pricing show that we aren’t blowing smoke.” 
Pricing information also helps cast light on the consequences 
of other aspects of the FDA’s operations. Consider the Unap-
proved Drugs Initiative (UDI), launched in 2006. The UDI was an 
attempt to deal with various drugs that were being sold without 
FDA approval because they had been on the market before the 
1938  Food and Drug Act requiring safety evidence or the 1962 
amendments requiring safety and effectiveness evidence. Consis-
tent with the UDI, the FDA warned companies that specific drugs 
were unapproved and invited them to test them. Firms that tested 
their drugs received a period of market exclusivity. 
From the FDA’s perspective, the UDI was a straightforward 
strategy to push unapproved drugs off the market, using a car-
rot (market exclusivity for firms that tested their drugs) and a 
stick (enforcement actions against firms that failed to test their 
drugs). Best of all, the costs of market exclusivity were externalized 
to consumers, rather than treated as an on-budget expense for 
the agency. Predictably enough, multiple companies conducted 
some quick and dirty testing, and then used the resulting market 
exclusivity to jack up prices. The most aggressive/creative compa-
nies also sought to achieve orphan drug status for their products, 
further increasing the period of market exclusivity. 
The pricing consequences of the UDI were clear. To pick 
one example, the price of colchicine, used to treat gout, went 
from 10¢ a tablet to $5. Unsurprisingly, these increases in cost 
affected utilization. One study found “a reduction in colchicine 
initiation and an increase in patient spending … [but no] associa-
tion with improvements in avoidance of potentially dangerous 
co-prescriptions.” 
Of course, the pricing consequences of the UDI were not 
limited to colchicine. The price of 17-OHP, used to prevent pre-
mature births, went from $15 per injection to $1,440. The price 
of extended-release guaifenesin, used in cough syrup, went up by 
700%. Other examples are not hard to find. 
If the policy focus is solely on reducing the number of unap-
proved drugs on the market, the UDI would have to be scored an 
unmixed success. But if the focus includes information on drug 
pricing and access to care, the case looks quite different. Indeed, 
if the FDA had thought about drug prices, it is far from clear that 
it should have gone forward with the UDI. At a minimum, greater 
consideration should have been given to the likely pricing conse-
Why wouldn’t an ageny charged with regulating a market 
pay attention to pricing information about the goods 
being sold in that market—especially when the agency 
controls access to that market?
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quences of granting an extended period of market exclusivity for 
cheap drugs that had been on the market for decades.
The FDA’s response to criticisms of the UDI also reveals its 
mindset. In an October 2010 letter published in the New England 
Journal of Medicine in response to an article about the colchicine 
debacle, FDA officials Janet Woodcock and Sarah Okada wrote:
Because URL Pharma was the first to submit clinical trial data 
and be granted approval for oral colchicine, federal law required 
that the company be given marketing exclusivity for the indica-
tion of acute gout for 3 years and for the indication of familial 
Mediterranean fever for 7 years. Congress wrote these laws to 
encourage innovation, although such regulations sometimes 
have a broader sweep. The FDA is required to implement the 
laws as written and has no authority to regulate drug prices. 
Manufacturers could seek approval for colchicine for chronic 
gout; no marketing exclusivity exists for this indication.
The FDA is focused on ensuring that all drugs are held to 
the same safety, efficacy, and quality standards. The FDA noted 
117 non-overdose deaths (some recent) that were associated 
with oral colchicine (with 51% involving an interaction between 
colchicine and clarithromycin). Clinical trials of Colcrys 
showed that lower doses were as effective as higher doses and 
produced fewer side effects. As a result of the FDA’s review and 
approval of Colcrys, this information must now be included in 
the drug’s label.
Stated more concisely: “It’s not us; it’s the law. And don’t bother 
us about pricing, because that’s not our problem either.” 
But Congress and the general public were entirely unpersuaded 
by these arguments. For colchicine, there was universal outrage 
about the price increases. For 17-OHP, the outcry in Congress 
and the news media was so loud that the FDA backed down and 
allowed compounding pharmacies to continue to manufacture 
the product. These reactions point to the second reason for the 
FDA to pay attention to drug prices: because people expect it 
to. When a public agency visibly fails to do what Congress and 
the general public expect it to do, bad things happen to agency 
leadership—and sometimes to the agency itself. 
For both of these reasons, we believe the time is ripe for the 
FDA to start paying attention to drug prices. If the agency doesn’t 
address this issue on its own, it may well find the issue rammed 
down its throat. 
GAMING THE FDA APPROVAL PROCESS:  
CITIZEN PETITIONS AND REMS
So far, we have focused on the pricing consequences of the UDI 
and the FDA’s failure to approve generic drugs in a timely man-
ner. But other aspects of the FDA’s operations create the oppor-
tunity for similar adverse effects on pricing. Consider citizen 
petitions. In theory, citizen petitions provide a way for external 
constituencies to trigger FDA scrutiny of drugs that the agency 
would otherwise overlook or assign a lower priority. But citizen 
petitions can also be used to deter generic entry, as Mylan did 
with the Epi-pen and ViroPharma did with Vancomycin. 
The FDA’s Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) 
authority raises many of the same concerns as citizen petitions. 
The authority enables the FDA to require drug manufacturers 
to formulate and carry out strategies intended to mitigate risks 
associated with unrestricted use of specific drugs. But REMS can 
also be used to delay generic entry. In 2014, fully 40% of newly 
approved drugs had a REMS. One study estimated that delays 
in generic entry attributable to REMS cause Americans to pay 
an extra $5.4 billion per year for drugs. If that estimate is correct, 
branded drug companies are likely to view REMS as a briar patch 
they want to be thrown into, rather than a real constraint on their 
ability to market their products.
As these examples indicate, the pricing problems associated 
with FDA action/inaction are not limited to UDIs and the agen-
cy’s failure to approve generic drugs on a timely basis. As our 
discussion of citizen petitions and REMS indicates, multiple 
aspects of the agency’s operations can have unintended adverse 
consequences on drug pricing. Unless the agency is paying atten-
tion to the issue, it will find it more difficult to detect such (mis)
conduct and track changes in the tactics that are being employed 
to game the FDA approval process. Even if the agency partners 
with the Federal Trade Commission to address anticompetitive 
behavior, it still needs to regularly scrutinize its own operations 
to ensure they are not being turned to anticompetitive ends.
RISKS OF UNLEASHING THE PRICING  
GENIE WITHIN THE FDA
The FDA has long thought of itself as the safety and efficacy 
agency. What are the likely consequences and risks of allowing or 
encouraging the FDA to pay attention to drug prices? The most 
obvious risk is that the agency will decide it is in the price-setting 
business or come under sufficient pressure that it starts doing 
so. This is likely to prove a particular problem for branded drugs, 
where high prices are primarily attributable to the mechanisms 
by which we pay for prescription drugs, rather than to anything 
the FDA is or isn’t doing. 
Of course, paying attention to prices will require the FDA to 
hire personnel with the appropriate skill-set: economists and law-
yers. Organizational issues (e.g., should those responsible for the 
pricing portfolio be integrated into the drug approval teams, or 
set up in their own bureau? Who gets the last word?) will need to 
be resolved. There are likely to be intra- and inter-agency conflicts 
that will need to be mediated. How well or poorly these complexi-
ties are handled will make a big difference in whether having the 
FDA pay attention to drug prices works out well or poorly. 
INTRUDER ALERT!
The most common objection to our proposal is based on statutory 
text. If the FDA is the safety and efficacy agency, doesn’t it violate 
the statutory mandate for it to pay attention to drug pricing? And 
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doesn’t the absence of statutory provisions relating to drug pric-
ing from the 21st Century Cures Act indicate that Congress has 
no interest in allowing the FDA to pay attention to drug pricing? 
We think both of these objections are overstated. For those 
who believe in a “living Constitution” and free-wheeling policy-
oriented theories of statutory interpretation, the absence of 
explicit congressional authorization is a barely discernable speed 
bump on the way to the desired objective. 
For textualists and originalists, the absence of explicit statu-
tory authorization implies the FDA may not consider drug pricing 
in deciding whether to approve or disapprove a drug. Any doubt 
on that issue is removed by the failure of Congress to include 
specific language on the subject in the 21st Century Cures Act 
after it was urged to do so by various commentators. 
But even if we adopt the strictest possible construction of the 
agency’s statutory authority, it does not follow that the agency 
may not consider drug pricing in setting the agenda for the 
drug approval/review process, let alone in evaluating the effect 
of handing out market exclusivity. Other drug companies might 
complain about queue-jumping, but there is no property right 
in a company’s place in the queue. Besides, the knowledge that 
the FDA might opt for queue-jumping if prices for generics rise 
discourages incumbent drug companies from doing just that. 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
It is one thing to say that the FDA should pay attention to drug 
prices and entirely another to have a theory about what consti-
tutes a pricing problem, let alone what the agency should do if it 
finds one. In this short essay we cannot address these problems in 
any detail. In a longer version of this article that is forthcoming 
in the New York University Journal of Law & Liberty, we offer four 
simple but workable policy proposals: 
■■ The FDA and FTC should work together more closely. 
■■ The FDA should tighten its policies and procedures—start-
ing with those relating to REMS—to make it harder to game 
them to serve anti-competitive ends. 
■■ The FDA should send a clear signal to pharmaceutical com-
panies that anticompetitive behavior will not be tolerated. 
■■ Finally, the FDA should also send a clear signal to Congress 
and the public that the agency can’t fix everything that 
is dysfunctional about drug pricing. For example, to the 
extent pricing problems are attributable to the way we have 
chosen to pay for pharmaceuticals, the FDA can do little or 
nothing to remedy that issue. 
FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb has announced his inten-
tion to move forward on the first two of our proposals as part 
of a new “Drug Competition Action Plan.” The plan will simul-
taneously encourage innovation in drug development while 
“accelerating the availability to the public of lower cost alterna-
tives to innovator drugs.” The FDA even 
held a hearing in mid-July 2017 to solicit 
input on ways to fix the FDA’s policies and 
procedures. So, we’re already halfway home. 
What about the UDI? As we have already 
suggested, viewed from an FDA-centric 
perspective, the UDI was a sensible and 
cost-effective way to get manufacturers to 
conduct the necessary tests for safety and 
efficacy, making it possible for the FDA to 
focus its efforts on getting the remaining 
unapproved drugs off the market. But from 
a broader perspective, the UDI was a foolish bureaucratic response 
to what was, from all appearances, a non-problem. The FDA did 
not bear the cost of conducting the necessary tests and it paid no 
attention to the pricing consequences of the market exclusivity it 
was handing out. But that did not make those costs any less real 
for the consumers who had to pay them. So what should the FDA 
have done? Sometimes leaving well enough alone is the optimal 
solution, particularly when the alternative is to make things worse.
CONCLUSION
In our view, the FDA should pay attention to drug prices when 
the information imbedded in them is about the real-world conse-
quences of the agency’s actions and inactions. In some instances, 
the information conveyed by drug prices in this space will moti-
vate the FDA to change course or reallocate its priorities. Even if 
the agency elects not to make changes, at least it will know the 
consequences of its actions and inactions. 
What about pricing information that reflects larger market 
dynamics, such as supply disruptions, monopoly power, and dif-
ferences in prices across countries? In our view, the FDA should pay 
attention to pricing information that signals supply disruptions, 
inform the FTC and Justice Department about pricing that appears 
to be attributable to monopoly or oligopoly, and ignore dispari-
ties in pricing across countries. Of course, reasonable people will 
disagree on where exactly each of those lines should be drawn and 
what the FDA should do once it starts paying attention to pricing. 
Finally, regardless of where the lines are drawn, everyone involved 
should understand that the FDA is not the “fix everything that’s 
wrong with the drug market” agency. That way lies chaos. 
The information conveyed by drug prices will motivate 
the FDA to change course or reallocate its priorities. 
Even if the agency elects not to make changes, at least it 
will know the consequences of its actions and inactions.
R
Robert Higgs, Founding Editor
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